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NOTES
THE PRIMA FACtE TORT DOCTRINE IN
ANOTHER

NEW

YORK-

WRIT?

The motivating force in the development of law has always
been the needs of the people. The law must be geared toward
providing man with the security, opportunities and comforts of
an orderly society which guarantees, protects and enforces certain
basic rights and privileges. The concept of remedy has, therefore,
necessarily permeated our law and its development has been delicately keyed toward the realization of these rights and privileges.
In early English law, it was the need for remedy that prompted
men to petition the King for a writ to bring to court a particular
wrongdoer.' What resulted was the development of the English
common-law writ system which marked the beginning of modern
tort law. The first writ made available was that for the action of
trespass, which provided a remedy for all direct and immediate
injuries. 2 Eventually, due to popular need, the "action on the
case" was developed, extending a remedy to situations which involved obviously wrongful conduct, resulting in injuries which were

not forcible or direct. 3
The implementation of this common-law writ system was
choked by rigid procedural formalism.
Dissatisfaction mounted
and, by the middle of the nineteenth century, these rigid forms
of action were virtually abandoned in favor of more liberal procedural codes. Nonetheless, the lingering effect of the writ system
remained with the law and has plagued its development. 4 The
attitude persisted that unless a plaintiff could bring his action
under a particular form, label, or category of tort, he should be
remediless. However, strong opposition favored the adoption of

1W. PRossER, TORTS § 7, at 28 (3d ed. 1964).
21d. See generally C. FiFooT, ISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON
LAW 44-65 (1949); Deiser, The Development of Principle it Trespass, 27
YALE L.J. 220 (1917).
3 W. PROsSER, supra note 1, at 29. See generally C. FiFoo, supra note
2, at 66-101; Dix, The Origins of the Action of Trespass on the Case, 46
YALE L.J. 1142 (1937).
1 Professor Prosser suggests that the movement away from the common-law forms of action was slowed by a devotion to precedent and the
distrust of new ideas. W. PRossiz, supra note 1, at 19. See James, Tort
Law in Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial Process, 8 BuFFAwO L.
REv. 315 (1959).
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a basic unifying principle or rationale for the whole l.xv of torts.5

A landmark contribution was made to this effort by Lord Bowen
when he said:
intentionally to do that which is calculated in the ordinary course of
events to damage, and which does, in fact, damage another in that
other person's property or trade, is actionable if done without just
cause or excuse.0
It is generally agreed that7 this dictum marks the inception of the
"prima facie tort" concept. In this country, the doctrine enjoyed,
the distinguished support of Mr. Justice Holmes, who was responsible for its ultimate acceptance. s
And so, a unifying principle had been established, its virtue
being flexibility, its vice uncertainty and indefiniteness. Its usefulness and efficiency would depend on the wisdom of its interpreters. Remedy was no longer to be the product of a procedural
ritual, to be jeopardized by the slightest deviation from the required
form.9
In New York, the "prima facie tort" doctrine has received
extensive treatment. The following material will explore in depth
the development of the doctrine in this state. The reader is asked
to evaluate the New York construction on two grounds: first, does
rSee F. POLLOcx, ToRTs 16-17 (15th ed. 1951); P. WimN'ma, Toars
7 (T.
0 Lewis ed. 1954).
Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow, & Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598, 613
(1889), aff'd, [1892] A.C. 25. See also Skinner & Co. v. Shew & Co.,
[1893] 1 Ch. 413, 422: "At Common Law there was a cause of action
whenever one person did damage to another wilfully and intentionally, and
without just cause or excuse." Here Lord Bowen seems to be offering a
more generic statement absent the "trade or business" qualification he
employed in Mogul.
7Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 52 CoLTum. L. RPv. 503 (1952).
See Brown, The Rise and Threatened Demise of the Prima Facie Tort
Principle, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 563 (1959); Forkosch, An Analysis of the
"Prima Fade Tort" Cause of Action, 42 CopanmL L.Q. 465, 467-68 (1957);
Halpern, Intentional Torts and the Restatement, 7 Burntro L. Rnv. 7, 8

(1957).

s Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904): "[P]rima facie, the
intentional infliction of temporal damage is a cause of action, which, as a
matter of substantive law, whatever may be the form of pleading, requires
a justification if the defendant is to escape." Here again no "trade or
business" qualification is presented. The complaint alleged that the three
defendant newspaper companies had combined in an effort to ruin the
plaintiff's newspaper business by refusing advertising space at their regular
rates to anyone who would pay to the plaintiff the rate increase he was
asking. See Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HRv. L. REv. 1

(1894).

9For a treatment of the doctrine as utilized by various states, see

Forkosch, supra note 7; Note, The Prima Facie Tort Docrine, "uP'anote
7, at 504.
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it succeed in embodying the ideal of a unifying principle of tort
law, and second, does it efficiently serve the needs of the people,
and, if not, what reasonable alternatives can be forwarded that
will best provide for the availability of a just remedy?
The New York Rule
Action Not Otherwise a Tort
After receiving limited application in certain factual contexts, 0
the "prima facie tort" doctrine was explicitly recognized in Advance
Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co.21 The complaint alleged
that the plaintiff's music publishing business was damaged by the
defendants' capricious and inaccurate selection of the weekly ten
most popular songs.'12 Dissallowing the defendants' motion to dismiss for insufficiency, the Court adopted the reasoning of Mr.
Justice Holmes in his acceptance of the doctrine in Aikens v.
Wisconsin,13 and concluded that the "cause of action alleges such
a prima facie tort and, therefore, is sufficient in law on its face." 14
It has been suggested that perhaps the wording of this holding is
largely responsible for the great misunderstanding that has accompanied the doctrine throughout its development, viz., that the
.~"prima facie tort" doctrine merely represents an additional tort
category rather than a unifying principle of general applicability. 5
This misunderstanding produced the rule that "prima facie tort"
remedies would only be available where no traditional tort remedy
,I/ existed.' 6 .Further confusion developed when the doctrine was
said to be limited to intentional conduct resulting in damage "by
an act or series of acts which would otherwise be lawful."' 1T
Accordingly, any statement of facts which indicated a traditional
10See Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N.Y. 80, 140 N.E. 203 (1923), where
plaintiff's unsuccessful complaint alleged that the defendant established his
own competing newspaper business in order to injure the plaintiff; Al
Raschid v. News Syndicate Co., 265 N.Y. 1, 191 N.E. 713 (1934), where
the Court implied that a cause of action would lie for maliciously circulating
false information in order to instigate groundless deportation proceedings.
11296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401 (1946).
12By way of damages, the plaintiff alleged that music jobbers and dealers were greatly influenced by the defendants' selections and, as a result,
the value of his music was depreciated, his revenues diminished and his
business prestige impaired. Id. at 83, 70 N.E.2d at 402.
"3195 U.S. 194 (1904). See supra note 8.
14296 N.Y. at 84, 70 N.E2d at 403, citing American Guild of Musical
Artists, Inc. v. Petrillo, 286 N.Y. 226, 231, 36 N.E.2d 123, 126 (1941);
See 5also Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E.2d 349 (1941).
1 Brown, supra note 7, at 567. See Ward, The Tort Cause of Action,
42 CoRNEu L.Q. 28, 52-53 (1956).
26See Note, Recent Developments in. the New York Law of Prima
Facie Tort, 32 ST. JoHr's L. Rzv. 282 (1958).
17Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 769, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808, 811 (1st
Dep't 1955) (emphasis added).
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tort category had to be pleaded separately from the balance of the
action in "prima facie tort." 18
"Consequently, it is not surprising that the remedy need rarely
be invoked, for the 'categories of tort' are many, and development
within the categories is progressive indeed." 1 This exemplifies
the New York attitude toward utilization of the doctrine-to dis-j.courage reliance on it and limit remedy to the traditional categories of tort whenever possible ;20 and, when not possible, to ./
require strict adherence to pleading requirements of intent (malice) '
and special damages. 22 Various considerations are offered by the
courts in defense of this position: discouragement of spurious
claims, sloppy or inartful pleadings, so-called "shotgun complaints,"
and even the problem of calendar congestion.2 2
Moreover, the
courts are quick to note--attempts to invoke the doctrine as a
means of circumventing a shorter statute of limitations. In Morrison v. National Broadcasting Co.,23 the Court of Appeals declined the opportunity to deal definitively with the "prima facie
tort" principle and chose to dismiss the complaint as being barred
by the one year statute of limitations. 24 In applying "The statute,
the Court reasoned that it is the reality and the essence of the
action and not its mere name that controls.

25

Since the plaintiff's

cause of action "sounded" in defamation, "it would be highly unreal and unreasonable to apply some statute of limitations other
than the one which the Legislature has prescribed for the traditional defamatory torts of libel and slander." 26
'ISd. at 769, 146 N.Y.S.2d at 811: "If . .. the plaintiff intends to add
a claim for damages based on any of the traditional torts, each such tort
should be pleaded as a separate cause of action and the resultant damage
or injury separately stated" quoting Brandt v. Winchell, 283 App. Div.
338, 342-43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 865, 868 (1st Dep't 1954).
'1286 App. Div. at 770, 146 N.Y.S.2d at 811.
20 See Forkosch, supra note 7, at 475: "In New York the prima facie
tort doctrine has apparently had its greatest degree of legal adumbration,
sophistication, and qualification."
21 Forkosch, supra note 7, at 476.
22The courts strongly disfavor sloppy pleading and in attempts to repel
indifferent draftsmanship are swift to strike down such pleading. "Prima
facie tort" is not a magic phrase and will not rectify an invalid complaint.
Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 769, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808, 810 (1st Dep't
1955).
23 19 N.Y.2d 453, 227 N.E.2d 572, 280 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1967).
24N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. Acv §51(3) (now N.Y. Civ. PRAC. §215(3)).
The
Court also indicated that special damages had not been adequately proved.
2 19 N.Y.2d at 459, 227 N.E.2d at 574, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 644, citing
Brick v. Cohn-Hall-Marx Co., 276 N.Y. 259, 264, 11 N.E.2d 902, 904 (1937).
20 19 N.Y.2d at 459, 227 N.E.2d at 574, 280 N.Y.S.Zd at 644.
It is
interesting to note that the defendant argued and the appellate division, first
department, agreed that the cause of action could not be sustained in defamation for want of publication. It is highly questionable whether the statute
contemplates causes of action "sounding" in defamation; the statute is
more reasonably geared to the traditional tort category.
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Nevertheless, the prima facie tort principle was conceived
with the ideal of affording just relief, and this purpose or goal
remains with us today-unfulfilled by the inadequacies of the
traditional types of tort. Itis hoped that a closer analysis of the
New York rule and its requirements will present a workable
alternative to the ineffectual principle currently employed.
Malicious Intent

The early common law took little account of a defendant's
motives. "Malicious motives make a bad case worse, but they
27
cannot make that wrong which is in its own essence lawful."

But with the development of modern law, the motive for man's
actions took on greater significance. Complex relationships, coupled
with a need to balance conflicting interests, demanded an evaluation of one's motives in order to differentiate for the purposes of
liability.28 The formulation of the prima fade tort doctrine, of
course, requires the premise that the motives of an individual
may determine his liability, and that acts, usually acceptable, may
be made actionable if done with the motive of injuring another.
This element of intent presents three distinct degree-situations
which could reasonably be said to fall within the ambit of prima
facie tort:
V 1. Intent to do the act with the corresponding liability being
applied for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the
act ;29
.2. Intent to do the act and intent to injure, notwithstanding
the possible presence of some secondary motives; 30
.'3. Intent to do the act, the sole intent (or motive) being to
injure.3'
CooLEy, ToRTs § 534 (4th ed. 1932).
28 W. PROSSER, ToRTs § 5, at 24-25 (3d ed. 1964). See Ames, How Far
an Act May Be a Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor, 18
HmAv. L. REv. 411 (1905).
29 Morrison v. National Broadcasting Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 284, 290,
266 N.Y.S2d 406, 412 (1st Dep't 1965). Judge Breitel notes that the
defendants had no intent to injure the plaintiff for they hoped their hoax
would not be discovered. See The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice,3 41 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 279, 287-90 (1966).
oSee Forkosch, An Analysis of the "Prima Facie Tort" Cause of
Action, 42 CoRNmLL L.Q. 465, 477 (1957). Massachusetts has apparently
adopted a distinction between primary or secondary intent or purpose.
31 Reinforce, Inc. v. Birney, 308 N.Y. 164, 169-70, 124 N.E.2d 104,
106-07 (1954), quoting Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N.Y. 80, 90, 140 N.E.
203, 206 (1923): "[T]he genesis which will make a lawful act unlawful
must be a malicious one unmixed with any other and exclusively directed
to injury and damage of another" (emphasis added). See also Rochette &
Parzini Corp. v. Campo, 301 N.Y. 228, 93 N.E.2d 652 (1950); Schisgall
v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 207 Misc. 224, 232, 137 N.Y.S.2d 312, 319
(Sup. Ct 1955).
27T.
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It seems certain that the New York interpretation of the
doctrine is firmly entrenched in the third category. Any notions
New York might have entertained regarding a differentiation between primary and secondary intent (the second degree) were apparently abandoned with the decision in Reinforce, Inc. v. Birney.32
Although a 4-3 decision in the Court of Appeals, 33 it represents
the overwhelming authority in favor of New York's strict interpretation and correspondingly limited application of the doctrine.
The plaintiff's corporation was organized to supply labor for construction work. He received such workers from the defendant
union. A series of disagreements prompted the defendant to refuse to supply men to the plaintiff. As a result, the plaintiff was
forced out of business. The Court affirmed the appellate division's
dismissal 34 of the complaint, holding that the plaintiff had failed
to meet his burden of proving "that malice was the only spur to
the union's activity, or that damage to plaintiffs was the union's
sole purpose." 35
If the Reinforce decision is to be taken literally, the prima
facie tort doctrine must be deemed to have been relegated to a
rather insignificant corner in the library of tort law. The plaintiff's overwhelming burden of proving that the defendant's sole
intention was to injure makes practical reliance on the doctrine
most difficult, and perhaps impossible. Nevertheless, the Reinforce
decision remains the controlling mandate for all actions brought
under the banner of prima facie tort.
Despite the influence of varying policy considerations, no real
attempt has been made to distinguish prima facie tort causes of
action factually and thereby proportion the necessary degree of
intent to the harm realized. For example, while the policies favoring free competition and encouragement of enterprise might warrant the "sole intent to injure" requirement, no similar considerations demand retention of this requirement in the personal injury
area. 36 Apart from the usual situation where damage to one's
trade, business or profession is alleged," recovery has been sought
32308 N.Y. 164, 124 N.E2d 104 (1954).
33 Some conjecture must be entertained as to the reliability of the

holding of the case in light of recent changes in membership in the Court
of Appeals. Many believed the answer to be forthcoming in the Morrison
case, but the opinion stopped short of the merits of the doctrine itself.

34282 App. Div. 736, 122 N.Y.S.2d 369 (2d Dep't 1953) (mem.).
35 308 N.Y. at 167, 124 N.E.2d at 105. See Forkosch, supra note 30, at
477-79. The corporation was also a party-plaintiff.
36See Forkosch, supra note 30, at 479. The factual context should
determine the relationship between intent and justification by establishing
the 37particular policy considerations controlling.
Brandt v. Winchell, 3 N.Y.2d 628, 148 N.E2d 160, 170 N.Y.S.2d 828
(1958); Rager v. McCloskey, 305 N.Y. 75, 111 N.E.2d 214 (1953); Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70; N.E.2d 401
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? for damage caused by malicious instigation of groundless deportation proceedings, 88 malicious labor union activities,39 and even a
family conspiracy to destroy the marital and financial status of the
wife.40 In each situation, different policy considerations come into
play. This undoubtedly intentional failure by the courts to differentiate factually has distorted not only the intent requirement of
the doctrine, but also the element of justification and, perhaps most
strikingly, the requirement of special damages. It is strongly indicative of the New York attitude to confine the doctrine to what
might be termed a "newly created traditional tort."
A reasonable alternative to the Reinforce decision should be
discernible in the appellate division's opinion in Morrison v. National Broadcasting Co.d' The plaintiff was a university professor
who was induced to participate as a contestant on the defendants'
television quiz show by relying on their false misrepresentations
as to the show's legitimacy, when, in fact, it was "rigged." The
plaintiff alleged that, as a result of his innocent association with
the show and the resulting public exposure, his professional and
personal reputations were damaged and he was deprived of a
fellowship that might have been available to him.
Realizing the restrictive construction precedent had afforded
the prima facie tort doctrine in New York, Judge Breitel hastened
to dismiss any reliance on the "label" of prima fade tort. He
first eliminated the applicability of the sole intent or "disinterested
malevolence" 4 requirement by noting that the defendants had no
intention to injure the plaintiff, for they were gambling that there
would be no exposure. He then insisted that the defendants'
conduct was not "otherwise lawful," since the "ultimate purpose and
the scheme were corrupt, in the sense that no socially useful purpose but oniy gain by deceit was intended. . . ." '3 Thus, the
(1946); Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N.Y. 80, 140 N.E. 203 (1923).

A typical

statement was made in Benton v. Kennedy-Van Saunm Mfg. & Eng'r Corp.,
2 App. Div. 2d 27, 152 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1st Dep't 1956): "Competition as
such, no matter how vigorous or even ruthless, is not a tort at common
law." Id. at 29, 152 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
38 Al Raschid v. News Syndicate Co., 265 N.Y. 1, 191 N.E. 713 (1934).
39 Rochette & Parzini Corp. v. Campo, 301 N.Y. 228, 93 N.E.2d 652

(1950); American Guild of Musical Artists, Inc. v. Petrillo, 286 N.Y. 226,
36 N.E.2d 123 (1941).
do Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808 (1st Dep't 1955).
4124 App. Div. 2d 284, 266 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1st Dep't 1965), rev'd on
other grounds, 19 N.Y.2d 453, 227 N.E.2d 572, 280 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1967).
See generally The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST. JOHN's

279, 287 (1966).
L. Rnv.
42 This phrase was first used by Mr. Justice Holmes in Aikens v.
See also American Bank & Trust
Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 206 (1904).
Co. v. Federal Bank, 256 U.S. 350, 358 (1921).
43 24 App. Div. 2d at 287, 266 N.Y.S2d at 409. The New York interpretation maintains, of course, that only conduct "otherwise lawful" can
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court initiated a morally sanctioned criterion for determining what
was to be considered "otherwise lawful" conduct, rather than resorting44 to the simpler tortious-non-tortious distinction enunciated
above.
Turning attention next to the various related causes of action,
the court concluded that no liability could be based on any one
traditional tort, but rather elements of each tort were indeed present and when considered collectively could constitute an actionable
harm. For example, while plaintiff's action in defamation would
fail because of the lack of publication, the harm resulting to him
was identical (injury to reputation), although induced neither by
slander nor libel.4 5 Similarly, an action in deceit would feature
all the essential elements except that, although there was a knowing misrepresentation to induce the plaintiff to act, and plaintiff
relied upon it, the resulting harm was not in obtaining the plaintiff's
property or services. And finally, the element of foreseeability
of consequences, traditionally indigenous only to negligence theories, was of pivotal significance in determining the ultimate sufficiency of plaintiff's complaint. However, a negligence action
could not be maintained because the means employed were intentional.461 Every element in the plaintiff's complaint was identifiablewith some traditional tort category; conversely, the defendants'
conduct and the resulting harm to the plaintiff "fall neatly within
general principles of law, even if not within any of the numbered
forms of a form book." 4 7 Accordingly, the court concluded that the
intentional use of wrongful means (deceit), coupled with the re(negligence--defamation), "provides classic
sulting forseeable injury
48
basis for remedy."
be made actionable because of the malicious motive of the actor. Conduct
nof "otherwise lawful" could not be made actionable via the "prima fade

tort" doctrine.

44See text at note 17, supra. Judge Breitel's rather conceptual differentiation appears to be an attempt to further separate the New York construction of the "prima fade tort" doctrine from his holding and in so doing
elevate morals or ethics to a position of significance in determining liability.
4524 App. Div. 2d at 287-88, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 410. Other quiz show
participants who have employed this cause of action have been unsuccessful
for failure to allege special damages. Holt v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 791, 792, 253 N.Y.S.2d 1020, 1022 (2d Dep't 1964);
Clark v. National Broadcasting Co., 28 Misc. 2d 481, 482, 209 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61
(Sup. Ct. 1960); Davidson v. National Broadcasting Co., 26 Misc. 2d 936,
939, 204 N.Y.S.2d 532, 535 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Goldberg v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 25 Misc. 2d 129, 130, 205 N.Y.S.2d 611, 613 (Sup.

Ct. 1960).

4J624 App. Div. 2d at 287-88, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 410.

471d. at 288, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
s Id. See Penn-Ohio Steel Corp. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 7 App.

Div. 2d 441, 184 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1st Dep't 1959); Gale v. Ryan, 263 App.
Div. 76, 31 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1st Dep't 1941).
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As the precise rationale of the court becomes clearly focused,
a distinct resemblance to Lord Bowen's and Justice Holmes' ideal
of a general unifying principle becomes apparent. Resigned to the
fact that prima facie tort in New York meant little more than
another tightly construed tort category, Judge Breitel chose to
revitalize the theory under a different heading.49 Although decided
under the banner of "injurious falsehood," in theory the case represents the ideals of prima facie tort. In this atmosphere of true
prima facie tort, the Reinforce sole intent requirement is discarded
in favor of the more workable concept of probability as expounded
by Mr. Justice Holmes. "'If the probability of harm is very great
and manifest the act is called malicious or intentional. . . . If less
but still sufficient to impose liability it is called negligent. .

. .' " s

This concept of implied malice or implied intent to injure based
on the probability of the resulting damage should not offend
the legal conscience. It results from the application of classic concepts of tort law far more fundamental than the use of traditional
categories. It creates an atmosphere hostile to the strict dichotomy
between negligent and intentional conduct and the element of justification can be given perspective which is sympathetic to the injured party, yet conscious of the considerations underlying the
activity.

Justification
The element of justification was designed to afford the balancing mechanism of the various interests involved. A successful
prima facie tort action would mean that the interest of the plaintiff
in being free from injury outweighed the desirability of sanctioning the defendant's conduct. Although originally the desirability of the defendant's conduct was limited to the economic
area,51 the concept has developed to include both economic and
social justification.52
49 In this regard, it is interesting to note Judge Breitel's hesitancy in
naming the principle he expounded. He suggested that 'no doubt' much of
the difficulty in this area results from the use of labels-the idea being
that once a particular label is applied, substantive requirements are implied.
Nevertheless, the term resorted to was "injurious falsehood."
24 App.
Div. 2d at 292, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
5OForkosch, supra note 30, at 469 n.24. See also Commonvealth v.
Pierce, 138 Mass. 165 (1884).
For application of the doctrine in the
negligence area, see generally Brown, The Rise and Threatened Demise
of the Prima Facie Tort Principle, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 563, 564 n.11 (1959);
Note,
The Prime Facie Tort Doctrine, 52 CoLUm. L. REv. 503, 505-08 (1952).
51
Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow, & Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598, 613

(1889), aff'd, [1892] A.C. 25.
52 Campbell v. Gates, 236 N.Y. 457, 460, 141 N.E. 914, 915 (1923).
The
justification must be of a type that the courts will recognize. Advance
Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 85, 70 N.E.2d 401,
403

(1946).

See Note, Abstaining from Willful Injury-The Prilta Facie

Tort Doctrine, 10 SYvAcusE L. REv. 53, 59-62 (1958).
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Under the present construction of the doctrine as enunciated
by the Reinforce decision, the significance of defendant's justification in determining his liability is for all practical purposes eliminated. The premise is best expressed as the greater the intent required, the less the justification needed to excuse the resulting harm.
Accordingly, since Reinforce demands sole intent to injure, any
secondary motive, while not being sufficient to outweigh the plaintiff's interest in remaining unharmed, will violate the sole intent
requirement and thereby preclude recovery. It would be more
accurate, therefore, to speak in terms of secondary motive rather
than justification under the New York construction.
The Reinforce decision is of further significance in that it places
the burden of showing lack of justification upon the plaintiff, so
that absent proof that the motivation was solely malicious, plaintiff is without remedy5 3 The interplay between the elements of
intent and justification is obvious2 4 This crucial relationship as
portrayed by the Reinforce decision has relegated prima facie tort
to the smallest of pigeonholes. Considering the few situations in
which the defendant's conduct is solely malicious, coupled with the
plaintiff's difficult burden of proving lack of justification, practical
reliance on the doctrine seems impossible and the availability of
remedy appears limited by the slavish formalism of the traditional
tort categories.
It would be constructive, at this point, to apply the motive
definition utilized by Judge Breitel in Morrison to the determination
of the issue of justification. Judge Breitel treated the motive requirement for his "injurious falsehood" tort as falling within the
first degree-situation of intent, i.e., intent to do the act with the
corresponding liability being applied for the reasonably foreseeable
consequences of the act. Since the sole intent requirement was
not considered applicable, Judge Breitel was able to apply an unstilted concept of justification. While the defendant's desire to
make money would have necessarily constituted sufficient "justification" in a case where sole intent is an integral part of the cause
of action, it was not considered to be sufficiently socially desirable
to outweigh the harm to the plaintiff.
The importance of distinguishing fact situations in prima facie
tort actions is once again apparent when the element of justification is considered. As mentioned above, justification developed
first in the area of trade competition and, in many instances, any
53 Reinforce, Inc. v. Birney, 308 N.Y. 164, 170, 124 N.E.2d 104, 107
(1954).
5-1"Whatever may have been the motives of the defendant . . . was entirely immaterial. Even if it acted wilfully and maliciously . . . it would
not be liable provided it had a just and rightful purpose to serve." Peabody, Jr. & Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 240 N.Y. 511, 519, 148 N.E. 661, 664
(1925). See Benton v. Kennedy-Van Saum Mfg. & Eng'r Corp., 2 App.
Div. 2d 27, 152 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1st Dep't 1956).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 42

showing of a competitive motive was an absolute defense. 55 But
factual differentiation demands the application of varying social considerations. Justification of the means will vary with the nature
of the harm, the benefit sought by the defendant, and the means
employed. 5 While the competitive motive in the business world
might legitimately be retained as about absolute justification, the
mere showing of a profit motive should not constitute an absolute
justification where the same policies favoring free competition are
not involved, as in Morrison. In an action brought to recover for
injury resulting from union activity, where the acts bear a "reasonable connection with wages, hours, health, safety, the right of
collective bargaining, or any other condition of employment .. .," "
the defense of justification would be easily satisfied. Where personal, as opposed to business, motives are involved, a more stringent
application of justification would seem desirable. However, even
where the defendant acts for purely non-business reasons, other
policy considerations may operate to absolve the defendant from
liability. In cases involving instigation of judicial proceedings, it
is posited that society's interest in maintaining effective laws must
not be handicapped by discouraging the instigation of actions; this
interest is outweighed only when the proceedings prove absolutely
groundless.58
Considering the status of the doctrine as set forth in the
Reinforce decision, this discussion must be termed purely academic
and by way of suggestion. The sole intent requirement has paralyzed the basic principle of prima facie tort-justification. Placing
the burden of proving lack of justification on the plaintiff has
had a similar effect. The burden should rest logically with the
defendant unless exceptionally strong facts necessitate a presumption that the defendant's acts were fully justified. Then and only
then should the plaintiff be plagued with the burden of showing no
justification.
So far it is evident that considerable adjustments must be
made with the intent requirement and, consequently, the element
of justification. One element of prima facie tort remains to be
considered-the requirement of special damages. Together, these
55Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N.Y. 80, 140 N.E. 203 (1923); Benton v.
Kennedy-Van Saum. Mfg. & Eng'r Corp., 2 App. Div. 2d 27, 152 N.Y.S.2d
955 (1st Dep't 1956).
56 W. PROSSER, TORTS § 5, at 26 (3d ed. 1964).
57Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 355, 34 N.E.2d 349, 352
(1941).
58 Compare Brandt v. Winchell, 3 N.Y.2d 628, 148 N.E.2d 160, 170
N.Y.S.2d 828 (1958), where plaintiff unsuccessfully complained that the
defendant instigated harassing investigations of him and his business by the
State Attorney General, with Al Raschid v. News Syndicate Co., 265 N.Y.
1, 191 N.E. 713 (1934), where the plaintiff's allegations that deportation
proceedings were instigated by the defendant's furnishing immigration officials with false information were upheld.
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elements, if properly applied, will afford maximum availability of
a just remedy to the exclusion of ill-founded claims.
Special Damages
The New York construction of the prima facie tort doctrine
requires the pleading of special damages.59 An application of this
requirement can be found in Faulk v. Aware, Inc6 0 where the
plaintiff was required to specify in the complaint the names of
employers and customers who were claimed to have taken away
their business from the plaintiff, as well as the particular items of
loss claimed.61
The reason most often advanced for the blanket retention of
this requirement is best stated as follows:
To permit a recovery in prima facie tort upon an allegation and proof
of general damage would throw open to regulation of morals and
ethics all conduct which, when substandard, results in injured feelings
without other and special damage. It is allegation of temporal damage
which makes such an action maintainable upon a proper statement of
a cause in prima facie tort ....62
Another argument in favor of the requirement of special damages emphasizes the remedial purpose of the doctrine. It is argued
that since the prima facie tort doctrine is essentially an exception
to the rules of tort law, made to provide the plaintiff with additional
grounds upon which to claim recovery, the least a plaintiff can do
is show actual injury." The source of this argument is discernable
by resorting to the common law. The action of trespass, often a
basis for criminal liability, required no proof of any actual damage,
since the direct invasion of plaintiff's rights was regarded as a tort
in itself.6 4

The action on the case, on the other hand, developed

purely as a tort remedy for indirect injury; there could ordinarily
be no liability unless actual damage was proved. It is, therefore,
5 Brandt v. Winchell, 3 N.Y.2d 628, 148 N.E.2d 160, 170 N.Y.S.2d 828
(1958) ; Nichols v. Item Publishers, Inc., 309 N.Y. 596, 132 N.E.2d 860
(1956) ;'Rager v. McCloskey, 305 N.Y. 75, 111 N.E.2d 214 (1953); PennOhio Steel Corp. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 7 App. Div. 2d 441, 184
N.Y.S.2d 58 (1st Dep't 1959); cf. O'Connell v. Press Publishing Co., 214
N.Y. 352, log N.E. 556 (1915).
603 Misc. 2d 833, 155 N.Y.S.2d 726 (Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd
ewm., 3
App. Div. 2d 703, 160 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1st Dep't 1957).
-1See also Reporters' Ass'n of America v. Sun Printing & Publishing

Ass'n,
62 186 N.Y. 437, 443, 79 N.E. 710, 712 (1906).

Test v. Eldot, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 29, 1956, at 7, col. 4.

See Forkosch,

An Analysis of the "Prima Facie Tort" Cause of Action, 42 CoRNELL L.Q.
465, 470-77 (1957).
63 See Knapp Engraving Co. v. Keystone Photo Engraving Corp., 1
App. Div. 2d 170, 148 N.Y.S2d 635 (1st Dep't 1956).
64 W. PRossmE, TORTS § 7, at 29 (3d ed. 1964).
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concluded that since the prima facie tort doctrine developed from
the action on the case, the special damages requirement is logically
retained.
Despite the persuasiveness or logic of the argument in favor
of special damages, nowhere is there found any reference to the
basic distinction between general and special damages. General
damages, as distinguished from special, actual or temporal damages, are awarded for injury which "necessarily"

6s

follows from

the conduct complained of, or "whenever in the course of experience the loss is a direct and natural consequence of the wrongdoing." 66 The Morrison decision in the appellate division offered
a similar rationale which spoke of foreseeable
harm which nor7
mally results from a type of conduct.

Although the Court of Appeals did not pass on the merits of
prima facie tort or of the precise holding of the appellate division,
an interesting analogy can be appreciated from the decision. The
Court applied the one year statute of limitations by concluding
that the action "sounded" in defamation."8
It appears that the
"sounding" test would be highly accurate in regard to determining
the need to allege special damages. Accordingly, special damages
would be required in all actions "sounding" in defamation except
where the particular conduct could be more accurately described
as "sounding" in libel or slander per se. The awarding of general
damages in libel or slander per se actions results from the serious
probability of injury. The injury to the plaintiff in Morrison was
to his profession, a category of "per se" defamation, and therefore
general damages are indeed appropriate.
It is apparent then that this final requirement must also
undergo a significant re-shaping. The prima facie tort doctrine
must be geared toward an appreciation of the basic concepts of
damages based on probability. Only then will the doctrine serve
the interests of society and at the same time prevent the longexpected flood of spurious claims.
Conclusion
The restrictive attitude of the New York courts is seemingly
without logical justification. In an effort to confine the rule as
much as possible, for whatever reasons, the courts have aborted its
05C.
McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES §32 (1935).
See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §
904 (1939).
66 Ratcliffe v. Evans [1892] 2 Q.B. 524. See generally Halpern, Intentional Torts and the Restatement, 7 BUFFALO L. REV. 7 (1957).
8724 App. Div. 2d 284, 294, 266 N.Y.S.2d 406, 415 (1st Dep't 1965).
See Rager v. McCloskey, 305 N.Y. 75, 81, 111 N.E.2d 214, 217 (1953),
where Judge Fuld seemed to approve the test for general damages as
damages to be "calculated in the ordinary course of events."
a 19 N.Y.2d 453, 459, 227 N.E.2d 572, 574, 280 N.Y.S.2d 641, 644 (1967).
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purpose and ignored the basic ideals and principles upon which it
is based.
An alternative construction must be implemented if these ideals
and principles are not to be ignored. It must be evaluated on the
basis of its providing new avenues of just remedy based on a
common principle of tort law, without causing the dreaded rash
of petty, spurious complaints. To provide this remedy the doctrine
must flourish in an atmosphere that knows no strictures between
one "traditional" tort principle and another. Reliance on the doctrine, however, should be limited to conduct which is not otherwise a tort. Although violative of the general principle of prima
facie tort, the practical result for the injured party will be the
same; and the plaintiff is placed under no accountable hardship
considering the liberal provisions for amending complaints. All
non-traditionally tortious conduct which involves a reasonable probability of injury should be exposed to the possible sanctions of
prima facie tort. Where such injury has resulted, the defendant
must logically shoulder the burden of showing his conduct was
justified. If this probability of injury is great, the plaintiff should
be allowed to recover on a showing of general damages. If the
strict sole intent requirement is to be retained, its application must
be limited to the area of business competition.
It must always be remembered that the prima facie tort doctrine was conceived in an effort to provide maximum availability
of just remedy by initiating a common principle of tort law and
by eliminating the remnants of needless procedural formalism. What
is not often appreciated is that while the principle will extend to
society the availability of remedy, it will also exact from society
a more thorough implementation of the morals or ethics that are
mutually valued. Therefore, the benefit of the prima facie tort
principle is coupled with an obligation on the individual to conform
his conduct to what is best termed accepted norms.
The failure of the principle has marked an unfortunate failure
of the courts to provide for this extension of remedy and to impress this obligation on the conscience of society. The development
of the principle has been stunted while the predominant purpose
of the courts, i.e., to serve the people, has been frustrated. Practical considerations and problems of modern judicial administration
have undoubtedly been the source of this frustration. It appears
that many courts have relegated the needs of the people to a
secondary position outweighed by the congestion of the courts and
the substitution of the goal of maximum efficiency.
Efficiency
is a weak substitute for remedy, and no substitute for justice.

